

# Multi-Server Stable Rendezvous for the Metaverse


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Hong Kong University of Science and Technology






# Objectives

- fully decentralized
- community interests
- processing capacities on the servers
- latencies and bandwidth of links

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




# An optimization problem — rendezvous service in the Metaverse




**A toy example**




Users



Servers







Users




Servers





Users 


Servers 



Metaverse rendezvous service




Stable matching as the solution




Users



Servers












Users  

Servers 

**Let's dive into the details**



**An existing solution of stable  
matching problem**

**Definition 1** (Matching). *An outcome of the college admissions problem is a matching  $\mu : \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{C}$  such that  $a \in \mu(c)$  if and only if  $\mu(a) = c$ , and  $\mu(a) \in \mathcal{C} \cup \emptyset$ ,  $\mu(c) \subseteq \mathcal{A} \cup \emptyset$ ,  $\forall c, a$ .*

**Definition 2** (Individual rationality). *A matching is individual rational if and only if there does not exist an applicant  $a$  (or a college  $c$ ) who prefers being unmatched to being matched with  $\mu(a)$  (or  $\mu(c)$ ), i.e.  $\emptyset \succ_a \mu(a)$  (or  $\emptyset \succ_c \mu(c)$ ) should not exist.*

**Definition 3** (Blocking pair). *A matching  $\mu$  is blocked by an applicant-college pair  $(a, c)$  if they prefer each other to the match they receive at  $\mu$ . That is,  $c \succ_a \mu(a)$  and  $a \succ_c a', \exists a' \in \mu(c)$ .*

**Definition 4** (Stablility). *A matching  $\mu$  is stable if and only if it is both individually rational and not blocked by any other pairing between applicants and colleges.*



**How can we add multiple constraints in the existing matching problem?**

```

1: while  $\mathcal{N} \neq \emptyset$  do     $\triangleright \mathcal{N}$  denotes the set of unassigned users
2:    $i \leftarrow 0$ 
3:   for  $u \in \mathcal{N}$  do
4:      $s \leftarrow$  the  $i^{\text{th}}$  item from  $L(u)$ 
5:     Add  $u$  to the set of users on hold at server  $s$ ,  $\mathcal{H}(s)$ 
6:   end for
7:    $\mathcal{N} \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
8:   for  $s \in \mathcal{S}$  do
9:     for  $u \in \mathcal{H}(s)$  do  $\triangleright$  iterate in the ranked order in  $L(s)$ 
10:      Add  $c(u)$  into the set of community IDs  $\mathcal{C}(s)$ 
11:      if  $b(s, u) \leq B(s)$  and  $|\mathcal{C}(s)| \leq P(s)$  then
12:         $B(s) \leftarrow B(s) - B(s, u)$ 
13:      else
14:        Remove  $u$  from  $\mathcal{H}(s)$ 
15:        Add  $u$  into the set of rejected users  $\mathcal{R}(s)$ 
16:        Remove  $c(u)$  from  $\mathcal{C}(s)$ 
17:      end if
18:    end for
19:     $\mathcal{N} = \mathcal{N} \cup \mathcal{R}(s)$ 
20:  end for
21:   $i \leftarrow i + 1$ 
22: end while
23: return the final matching  $\mathcal{H}(s)$ 

```

Conditions to satisfy constraints



Fully decentralized  
Optimization solution  
Stability  
Scalability




Fully decentralized  
Optimization solution  
Stability  
Scalability


Is it Safe and Effective in the real world?




# An experimental case study — Multi-server federated learning




— CIFAR-10 & ResNet18







— CIFAR-10 &  
ResNet18




— CIFAR-10 &  
ResNet18

**Privacy,  
communication overhead,  
performance and latency are guaranteed**



# Objectives Revisited

- fully decentralized
- community interests
- processing capacities on the servers
- latencies and bandwidth of links
- privacy
- ...





[ningxinsu.github.io](https://ningxinsu.github.io)